SOUTH ATLANTIC JAZZ FESTIVAL (PTY) LTD

and

THE COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE

Appellant

Respondent

5U DGMENT

BINNS-WARD J:

This is an appeal against the judgment of the tax court' (see ITC 1871 (2014) and 76 SATC 109') dismissing the taxpayer's appeal to that coiirt brought in terms of s o 3 of the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 (’the VAT Act’) against certain

Constituted in ter us of s 1 16 of the Tax Adm in istration Act 28 of 20 1 1 (‘TAA'). which came into operation on 1 October 20 12.

’ The judgment of the coun a quo is also qnoted in fu11 in the ci-itical review by US EmsI ie publ isleed in Davis ct al (ed) The T‹r‹p‹ii er (Book 62. December 20 13) at 229.

assessnients innde by the Cornmissioner in respect of its liability to pay value added Max in the rele ant 2006 and 2007 pei iods or assessinent.' The appeal to thís court is Úrotight in terme of s 1 o (2)(a) read with s 270(2)(d) of the Tax .Administration .Act 28 o1 2011 ( T.AA’).

the taxpayer staged annual international jazz festivals in Cape Town durin¿ the period in question. In the course of that enterprise it concluded sponsorship a rcements with South /Yfricnn dir ans. the C ity’ o1 Cape Joan. the South Atrican Broadcasting Corporation and Fclkom in terms o1 which the sponsors paid money to vards anet provided goods and serv'ices fÒr the festivals. in retum for which the 1dXQfi}’Cl’ QFOX'idCd FOODS íll7d Services to the sponsors in the iorm or branding and mnrketing. The taxpaver and each of the sponsors were registered as ’vendors’ in ferms of the U.CT Act.

The appellant cas fiable to declara and pay output tax‘ on the Woods and services pro› ided to the sponsors in terms ot the aforementioned sponsorship a3reements. Its failure to have done so was identified in the course of a tax audit. I Isis resulted in the assessments in issue.' the appellant does not dispute its liability for output tax on the transactions. the matter in contestation is whether it should be cntitled to oftset that liability with a dediiction in respect of the input tax in respect of

' The appeal to the tax court (then constituted in temas of s S3 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 19ó2) was lodged on 8 J my 20.10. Section 33 of the VAT Act was repealed in terms of s 27.1 of the TAA. The appeal is deemed to have continued thereatíer as il brought in terms of s 107 of the AAA.

’Output 1‹ix is the tax cliarped by a vendor in terirs of s 7( 1)(a) of the VA"F Act. Section 7( I )(a)

¡arovides: ’.huh jcct to //ie e.xcmytion.s, c•xccptioils. ‹ley Jiiction.\ und ‹icljiist/iieofs pr ovi‹lc‹l Jor- ir¡ t/lis Acl, lllcrc• .:luill he le› real ancl ¡ ai‹l flor lhc• l›c•ncfíl of the Nutioncil Reveniie Funfl a ta.x, to hey knoi‹'n ci.s llie i’o/iie-o‹/‹les/ /‹w—

(‹i) ‹ n lhc• .s’iif fah’ hj r//iJ ve/irfe/- o/,qr›o‹/s ‹›r .service.s .s'iipyfier/ by hint ‹ n or’ lifter they

cv/ii/i/e/ic’e/iieof ‹lcite //i f/ie c‘on/.ic o/ ,/i/r/he/ o ccc o/o/i eo/e/-p/ i.se c'‹/r/ ter/ o/i by litter’

“ The assessments were made on 2.1 S“epterN ber 2009. The appellant lodged an objection to the assessments on 9 Noveiiiber 2009. The objection was disallowed by the Commissioner on 1.5.1 une 20.10.

” I nput tax’. inso far as clii i ently relevant is defned in the VAT Act as:

the supplies’ made to it by the sponsors. The Commissioner had declined to allow any deduction of input tax in the particular circumstances.

It is common ground bet een the parties that, despite their part cash components. the transactions in terms or the sponsorship agreements may be regarded essentially as barter transactlons. In consequence, and accepting. as one may, that the transactions ere at arms’ length. the aide ct the goods and services provided by the rippellant to the sponsors in each case falls to be taken as the same as that of ltte counter performance bv the relevant sponsor. the Commissioner was able to assess the sum of the appellant's liability 11 output tax on the basis o1 the information colitained in the respectiv'e sponsorship contr‹icts. Thus, for example, in the case of the transaction › itli Soiith African lii wa .s tlic value was determined as the monetary ec{ui alent of the alue of the transportation benefits provided to the taxpayer by the sponsor expressed in the contract in so-called travel rands“. 7 In an oi dinary arms’ length barter transaction the value that the parties to it have attributed to the goods or supplies that are exchanged seems to me, in the absence of any contrary indication. to be a reliable indicator of their market value. It is thus plain that the value o1 the goods and services provided to the taxpayer by the sponsors was equally determinable from the sponsorship contracts. (For reasons which are unexplained, and which do not appear to bear scrutiny, the Commissioner did not include the cash payment components of the sponsorships in the calculation o1 the value of the sei‘vices pro›•ided to the sponsors by the appellant.)

The sponsors w'eie required in terms of s 7(1)(a) of the VAT Act to levy v'a1ue added tax on the supply by theist of the goods and services concerned to the appellant. In terms of s 20(1) of the Act the sponsors were obliged within 21 days of the supply of the goods or services concerned to issue the appellant with a tax invoice in respect of the supply. The tax invoice was rcquired to set out, amongst other things. ‘ct/Aer -

the vr//tie ‹ f f/ie .›’upply, ltte rii7ir›i ii/ of lcix c'hatged cmd they c‹ ny’idc•ration /ñr lhc•

.›’iip Iy,’ ‹ (ii) ii'heat c• fñe nil aiinf ‹ [ fax c'6r/rper/ is c’alciil‹itc•tl 1›y applying they frix Ji acli‹ 1 In flic• c’‹ ii,t’i‹lc•ralion, the c’‹ n.›’icleI ation %r the y'iip 01y ancl c•ither the amount r¿/ // c h.v c‘ñrir cr/, ‹» J/ri/cii7eu/ /Ao/ it iuc/iir/e,v n charge in I e.eject ol lhe dcix anal

7 lt was con nion cause that ‘travel rands" were air travel vouchers redeemable as payment for any SAA

ltte i'rife rif ii /i/c‘fi // e /‹i. ii r/s c'br// pe‹/’. " The appellant would. stlbject to the applicable proc isions of the Act. be entitled to deduct the tax thus ie ‘ied on it by the sponsors from its llRbilit to the South \frican Revenue Ser›’ice in respect oF output

6] Section i â(2) ot’ the VA F ›Yct provided in refer ant part as io11o›vs at the pertinent time:

No ‹Jed uction of input tax in respect ot a supply r› I goods or serv ices. the importation of any woods intti the Rcpubl ic or any other deduciion shall be made in terms ot this ,Act. un less-

i‘‹/j a tax in voice or debit tiote or credit note in relation to that supply has been provided in accordance with section 20 or 21 and is held by the vendor

¡Tjak ing that cleduct ion at the time that any return in i‘espect of that supply is lin nished;

‹l›1 ‹ i) a document as is acceptable to the Comm issioner has tween issued in terms oI section 20 (6); or

( ii) a document issued by’ the supplier in cont p fiance with section 20 11) or

? I (5): or

(c)

7| It is common ¿around that. notwithstanding requests by the appellant that thev should do so, the sponsors had not provided the appellant w ith tax invoices and no clocunients of the nature desci ibed in s 1 6(2)(b) of the VAT Act had been issued. It 1s also common greund that the Commissioner was aware of the sponsors' failure to comply with their obligation to issue tax invoices, but, that notwithstanding his responsibility in terms of s 4( 1) o1’ the VAT Act ‘to carry out’ the provisions of the

.Act. tae had taken no steps to procure compliance by the sponsors with their obligation, or to have them prosecuted for their failure to do so." The tax court held that in those circtiiiistances the appellant could not make deductions in respect o1 the input tax.'"

Section 20(4)(g) of the VAT Act.

Section 4( I ) of the VA T Act has subsequently been i epealed and e ffective ly substituted by s 3(1 ) of the TAA.

'" The tax court stated in its jud3lrent that the appellant would have been well advised to have taken the steps necessary to enable it to create documents in terms of s 20(2) having the status of tax in voices i endered by the sponsor-suppl ters. Section 20(2) ot the VA T Act provides:

ts J rhe tax court jiidgment further held that the sponsors had in point ot fact not charged VAT on the value of’ the goods and services supplied and that the appellant had not paid VA f to the sponsors in respect ofi the supply of'such goods and services. It does not seem to me. however. that the observation by the learned judge a quo in this re aid affected the material finding of’ the court that the ‹ippeal should fail because of the appellant‘s inability to satisfy the requirements of s 1 6(2)(a) or (b) of the VAT Act. It is in any event not apparent tiom the judgment on what basis the tactical finding i ‘as made. lt may have been predicated on the provisions of the S›\BC and S›\A sponsorship contracts which expressly excluded VA"f in certain respects. thus. for example. clause 4.6 of‘ the SAA contract provided ’.l/f ‹intoiiiif.s in lhi.v agi c•c•inc•iil exc’lii‹1c• I".4 E anal t"AT shall he ›cii‹l hp 111c .SPt1N!SGR upon rc•c’eiyt oJ ti Vol"L invoice Jr out (the appellant]‘. Counsel for the Commissioner advanced a similar line of”ar::t1inent before us on appeal relying on those contractual provisions.

[9] In my jiidgment the approach overlooks that what rec}iiired to be determined in iespect of the appellant‘s claim to be entitled to a deduction for input tax was the oyc•n inorkt•l v‹iJiic•’ ' ' of the supplies given by the sponsors in consideration for the

.sei vices provided by the appellant. In the context of’what is accepted by the parties to have been akin to a barter transaction, the value of” the goods and services supplied by the sponsors f'ell tor tax purposes to be determined in terms ot‘ s 10 of the VAT Act. Section 10(3)(b) provides that For Ihc• piitpo.ve.: oJ ihi.v Acut the amount ‹›f ‹tny c’onsi‹lei cilion re f‘c•ri cccl In in lhi.v .vc•clion .vhcill he - lo lhe extenl that .vuch c’olf.vi‹lc•rcilion i.v not a exon.vidc•rcilion in itwnc•y, lhc• opc•n inurkc•t vciliie of lhat

‹lc›ctuu‹•iil .sluill her ‹lc•c•itted to be ci tax invoices J»-ovic/e‹f hy lhe sttyylic•r tinilet stihsc•ction 11) of lliis .vec/ioit ii'/ic•rc•-

t‹i1 hich €’ouutti.ssioiter loci. gt-anlc•‹l purer approval]br flue is.sue ofsiie'li doc-uutenls hy a

th)

(cj

That obiter statement of opinion was misconceived, with respect. It overlooked the appellant*s inability to have complied with the cumulative requirements of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the subsection.

' See tl›e definition of the term in s I of the VAT Act read with s 3 of the Act.

‹‹ n.s’i‹lei a!ion’. There has not been any dispute between the parties on the Commissioner’s computation of the open market v'alue of the goods and services in uciestion. On the contrary. the alue of the non-cash benefits received by the appellant front each of the sponsors › as common cause in the tax court. there was

:a1so no contention in the tax court that the sponse rs had not supplied the goods and ser› ices stipulated in the sponsorship agreements.

[ I()] Inso far as currently l'ele tant s 10(2) or the V AT .Act provides:

Note ithstandinJ tiny contractual an angements that were in place. the sponsors did not

:iccount separatel for the tax on the consideration given by the appellant. the tax levied by them is thus deemed to have been an amount equal to the tax traction of the open market value or the goods and services supplied. By virtue of its cotinterprestation in terms or the barter transaction. the appellant must be taken to have paid the tax and it should have been issued with the i'elevant tax invoices by the sponsors.

11] In the circumstances the only question that the court below was called upon to declde was whether, in the context or the failure, despite demand, by the sponsors to leave issued tax invoices, the provisions of either s 20(7)(b) or 16(2)(I) of the VAT Act should have been applied to allow the appellant the deductions in respect of input

(12] Section 20(7)(b) provides:

'' See the def nit ion of /ri.v /j-/c’/i‹›ii’ in s 1 of the VAT Act.

7

I he Commissioner must be able to be :satisted as to two things before he may direct that a tax inx'eice is not rec)uired to be issued: (i) the existence or av-ailability of stif ticient dociiiiientary records and (ii) the impracticability of requiring a Hill tax invoice to be issued.

It nsas ai gued on behal i of the appellant that the sponsorship contracts afforded sufficient records’ of the supplies concerned. In the context of there being no contention that the stipulated goods and services had not been supplied and no dispute that the contract documents record their open market value. I am willing for

¡Present purposes to accept that argument. 1 am unable. however. to find that it would I e impractlcal to require that a Hill tax in oice be issiicd’. No basis for any such

!i nding is apparent on the record. Nie net that the sponsors have failed to issue the invoices does not make it impractical to require that they be issued. (9n the contrary it was the Commissioner's responsibility in the circiimstances to compel their issue. The evidcnce provides no basis for us to find that the Commissioner could reasonably

!iave been satisfied as to the requirement or impracticability.

Section 16(2)(t3 of the VAT Act provided as follows bCiore its amendment in terms of s 17 ( 1)(a) of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 31 o1 201c w'it1i ctfect from 13 December 2013:

The phrase /u any oihc•i c‘ri. e’ distinguishes the circumstances in which s I 6(2)(9 might apply front those in which paragraphs (a) to (e) of the subsection pertain. The provision was inserted by s 0(c) ot Revenue Laws Second Amendment Act 36 of 2007 with effect from 8 .January 2008. Counsel for both parties were agreed that the

matter is amenable to determination taking the provisic 4 into account because it a's in operation when the rele› ant assessments » ei‘e made.

15] Nleiition has already been made of the fact that it was not in issue that o hat the parties w eie content to cliaracterisc as barter transactions were implemented, and that it may thus be inferred that the 3ools and seri'ices stipulated to be pro ided b the sponsors under the sponsorship contracts (which 'ere in writing) were indeed pro› ided. \s .ilso mentioned, it is e ident (hat the Commissioner predicated his calc uiation of the output tax on the information pro›•ided in the contracts. ’ The appellant's contention 1s that the contracts also ser› e as proo I o1 its entitlemcnt to a cieduction lor input tax. In in; jricignaent the contention is well-made. 11 the

‹documents were good enough for the Comiaaissioner to assess the appellant“s output tax liability. it is impossible to conceive leaving regard to the character of the

{Particular ti ansactions. wh they should not also have been sufficient for the purpose r›f“ computing the input tax which should have been deemed to have been levied by the s¡aonsors. t'he appel tant had inx'oked the provisions ot s 1 6(2)(I) in its representations to the C‹rciaissioner. In the circumstances he was bound to take them into account in making the assessment. I do not think that the Commissioner could reasonably have

‹decided that the information in the contracts did not in the circumstances providc suf ficient proof substantiating the appellant's entitlement to the deductions claimed. The Commissioner disallowed the deductions becatisc the appellant was not in possession of' rele› ant tax invoices." that was also the only ground for disallow ing tlac deductions expressly advanced by the Commissioner in his Statement of Grounds or Assessment filed in terms or rule 10 of the rules issued in terms of s l07A of the Income Tax Act 58 ot 1962 and its replacement, s 103 (read with s 264) of the TAA.’' He did not explain why s 1 ti(2)(i) should not have applied.

'' 41 eIe appears to be an ai it!unetical problem in respect ot the assessment of the appellant’s IiabiIity for output tax in respect of the 2006 sponsorsli ips. but the point is borne out by the computation of the assessment in respect of ice 2007 festival. Thei'e is no su33estion in the evidence that there was a conceptual differ ence in the method of making the assessments in respect of the two years concerned. ' W hen the assessments ›vei‘e made the Commissioner purported to disal low any deduction for the inptit tax on the 3rotind that '.4 .scruple o[inpilt Inc cxpen,se. ›vllich voii want to claim ci,gc1inst I/ie

.›’/7o/i.sql s/ii/v.s ec’e/*cr/ i 1//ir/, // //c'ri/er/ //i// //ie c.tpe›i.s’e.i' ir'e/ e o//-c or/)' o//oit’er/ th p/ cv'ious vol Periods. Ve /i//’//tel /nyi// law c.vFcn.schs ›i ill Illest cfi c he" cilloii ccl in tlsi.s esycc'/.’ (SA RS’ Ichef to the appeIfact’s public officer dated September- 20G9.) It was com iron cause that there was no factual poem ise t“or that statement.

' “ Par-a 5.4 ot the statern ent.

Fhc respondent‘s counsel sought before us to counter the appellant“s reliance on s 16t 2)(f) on three bases.

Firstl v. he submitted that the pro 'ision i ’us not of application to deductions claimed in respect of input tax. Coiinsel contended that the provision bore onlv on

‹iiiJ ‹›tlic•r ‹le‹li ’tieii.› " as mentioned in the introductory part of the subsection.’ That argument may be clisposed of summarily in mv view. It is simply not sustained by the plain and iinambi euous wor ding of the pi'ovision. Paragraph (I) is expressly intencled to provide a general supplemental basis for the allowance in cases in addition to those specificall y icicntiiled in paragr‹iphs (a) to (e). die phrase in any other case’ means in any case other than those in (a) to (c). According to its tenor the paragraph applies m respect of and cleduction comprehended in the introductory part of the subsection — that includes deduction ol in ful tax in i e›peci o/ ci .›ii/›y/v o/ gooâs ‹›r .se•i vic’c‹v .

Secondl y. lie contended that although the documentation i.e. the sponsorship contracts] i'efers to amounts, there is no cv idence on i‘ecord that the tiinounts referred to can in any way be equated to the value of the services rendered or the consideration paid there for’. He also argued that the documentation did not comply with the requirements of s 20(4) of the VG F Act.

[l9] In i e ard to the iespondent’5 second contention, I agree with the submission lay Mr .Yhollo-Don ¿lvi.s SC for the taxpayer that it is not open to the Commissioner. in circumstances when the point was not clearly taken earlier, to contend for the first time at this stage that the appellant should have adduced evidence on the value of the consideration given for the goods and services provided by the sponsors. Moreover. not only was the point not taken. as described. but the Commissioner has proceeded for his own purposes using the information in the documentation as sufficient for computing the output tax. As recently observed by Ponnan JA in C’oinini.›’sionei ,

.South Alrican Ec•› c•i1iie !Sc•r»ic’e v' #rcforin Ea.›’t How I.s (PI y) LU *014 (5) SA 2o 1

'" Quoted in para [ 14], above.

point taken b; counsel is in any event lnconsisknt with the ef1“ect of this acceptance o1 the characterisation od the transactions as barter ti ansactions.

20] S“ection 20(4) of the V+\ I .Act prescribes the particularity that must be set out in .i tax in› oice. 4tuch of it has not1iin¿a › hatsoever to do with the entitlement to an input tax deduction. for example, the requirement that the woi ds ’tax ink oice’ must 0QQ0fl1’ 114 ñ prominent place on the document. that it must bear a ›eria1ized number and Plate of issue. and that it must bear the name. address and V›\T registration number or the supplier. If the requirements o I s 20(4) had to be satisfied, there would be no need or scope for s 16(2)(i). .Xs it is. the identity of the suppliers is evident 1rout the contract documents. It is not in issue that they are registered › endors. they

.ill happen to be organs or state. I heir addresses are wcll-know"n, o1' FC£tClily

:iscertainab1e. the quantity or volume of the goods and services supplied is also cietermined in terms o I the contractual documentation. That what as stipulated was supplied is not in iserie. It is also not in contention that the sponsors were obli red to issue the appcllant w'ith tax invoices and that they have failed to do so despite request. Nie respondent“s reliance on non-compliance with s 20(4) is wholly withoiit merit.

[21] The third basis was a contention that the appellant’s challenge to the assessment on the grounds that the Commissioner should have allowed the input tax deduction in terms of’ s 1 6(2)(I) comes down to seeking to jtidicially review thc Commissioner's decision not to accept the contract documents as proof of the appellant's entitlement to a deduction. The argument proceeded that the Commissioner’s decision in that regard constituted administrative action’ as defined in the Pi'omotion of Adrnlnlstrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 ('PAJA") and i1’ it is to be impugned may be done only in terms of an application in terms of s 6 of that statute, and not by appeal in terms of the VAT Act. It was submitted that the tax court has no jurisdiction to entertain review applications in terms of PAJA.

! ’

|1

t2) SA 665 (T). I hat matter concerned £t14 appeal to the Full Court of the Transx-aal l°rovincial Dix iSlOli against a judgment of the Special Tax Court w‘hich had upheld the taxpayer's appeal against an additional income tax assessment wade by the Commissioner. >\t p. 671 Ct- I, Van der Walt .I desci'ibed the arginnent adv'anced on l›ehalf ot the Commissioner as follow s:

!n the course ot the ar*uiisent on behal f of the appellant it sx'as subni itted that the respondent load in redirected lb‘ sou3ht relief from the Special Income tax Ceurt. the submission came vioivn to say ing that in dec id in to make an additional assessment in terms o fi s 79( l )( i) [of the

I ncoine tax .Act] the appellant was c xe cis_io an adir inistrative ciiscretion. wliich was not

susceptible te appe‹il. but only to i eview. Such a review can. so the aruurrient went, only be lv on ht in terms ot U niti›rm Rule 53 before the Supreme Court as the Special Income T‹ix C our-t is a cre‹iture ot statute havin3 on ly the powers and capacity provided tor in .ss 83 and S4 oi the Income U‹ix Act. that power ‹ind capac ity does not inc hide a power of revie iv.'7 (My ti ‹tns lat ion trout the Afrikaans.)

fire l'iill Court rejected the argument. It held that save in respect of clecisions in relation to which a right of appeal was expressly excluded by the tax legislation. the tax court was empowered to take into consideration whether or not the Commissioner had prtiperl y exercised his discretiofl lft respect of makinu assessments that were subject to appeal. In that context. so the Court held. where the exercise of discretion is pertinent to the liiaking of the impugned assessment. the appeal is in reality a ieview’ of’ the Commissioner's decision on customary review’ grounds.'" The Full Court’s reasoning, which attracted no adverse comment in the juddment of the

/Xppe1late Division to which the matter w'as taken on further appeal, I' is compelling. It is also conceptually consistent in all material respects with the judgment ofi Van Winsen J ln ITC 9o 6.24 SATC 361. from w‘hich Van Walt I quoted extensively in the course of his judgment.

23] there has been no suggestion by the Commissioner that the assessments in issue in the current case ’ere not susceptible to appeal. The Commissioner's decision not to .illo a deduction in terms of s 1 6(2)(13 of the VAT Act ’as integral to the braking o1 thc assessments. The matter is thus in all respects relevant for the jtii'isdictional .argument dircctl; analogous to that › hich presented in Ti Inn van/se

.Siiikerkor/vr» a sie. Indeed. Mr’ ñr›ekci›ioer. ho .tppeaied for the Commissioner. was enable to clistinguish the matter in principle. Sa¥’C tO SiiJ’ [hat the earlier cases were viecided before the enactment of P›\.IA. In this regard counsel laid emphasis on the de tnition of corn't in s 1 of P/\JA"’ and submined that it did not include the tax court. there is nothing in the argument. P.UA regulatcs the bringing ‹ind determination oi rev'iew applications in terriis o1 s 6 of the statute; it is not directed at the bringing anti determination of appeals in terms ot the tax laws administered under the FA \. Nie appellant in the current matter was exercising a right ot appeal to the tax court against the assessments: it was not seek ing the review and setting aside of a

‹decision in terms of s 1 6(2)(I) of the V \T Act. the fact that the determination of the appeal not g1it entail the tax court in considering the legality of ate administrative rlecision that was integral to the making of the assessment does not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to decide the appeal. To intei‘pret and apply the legislation as requiring the dichotomous procedures enjoined in the argument advanced on behalf of the Commissioner would in many cases defeat the very purpose of the establishment or the specialist tax court. The jurisdiction of the tax court to determine tax appeals is conferred without any limitation in s I 17(1) of the TAA. The ceurt must be taken to have been invested with all the powers that are inherently necessary for it to liilfil its expi essly prov'ided fiinctions.

In the i'esult I consider that the appeal must succeed. The additional assessments iiiust be set aside and reiaiitted for reconsideration by the Commissioner

in the 1ight of this jiicigment. .\n order whiff issue. substantially in the terms sought b} the appellant. as follows:

the appeal is upheld. with costs.

2 The order of the tax court is set aside and replaced w ith an order as follows:

die appellant's appeal against the additional V.fi T assessments na‹ide for the tax perioris 04/2006. 12.'2006. 04/2007, 05/2007 and 1 2’2007 is upheld

i

'

S-WARD

,Judge of the High Court

J

the asessmcnts ai e set aside and referred back to the Commissioner for reconsideration.

W'e concur".

. .M. HLOPHE “

Jud•ge President

J.I. CLOETE